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MAKING THE JURORS THE “EXPERTS”: 
THE CASE FOR EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Abstract: Although courts and scholars have long recognized the weak-
nesses of eyewitness testimony, the legal system has yet to find a satisfac-
tory mechanism for educating jurors—who are generally unaware of the 
complex psychological processes that affect eyewitness accuracy—about 
the inherent fallibility of such testimony. Many scholars argue that the 
best option is to allow an expert witness to testify to the factors that can 
affect an eyewitness’s ability to perceive and remember. Yet eyewitness ex-
pert testimony presents several practical and equitable concerns, and 
even in jurisdictions that allow eyewitness experts, trial courts have been 
far from consistent in their admission of such testimony. Cautionary jury 
instructions avoid many of the same pitfalls and, in fact, carry several in-
herent advantages. Many of the eyewitness instructions now given by 
judges, however, are ineffective: they contain ambiguous and confusing 
language, they are given at the end of trial as part of a long list of other 
legal instructions, and in many cases, they reinforce jurors’ erroneous as-
sumptions about eyewitnesses. This Note argues that eyewitness instruc-
tions should be provided before the eyewitness testifies, thus alerting ju-
rors in advance to the factors they should consider in evaluating the 
testimony. The Note also proposes a model instruction, which attempts to 
convey the relevant scientific and legal principles in a way that will be 
meaningful and understandable to lay jurors. 
Introduction 
 At 8:30 p.m. on November 30, 1987, a Caucasian woman in Marcus 
Lyons’s apartment complex was raped in her apartment.1 She de-
scribed her attacker as a two-hundred-pound black male, with a “large 
belly and hips.”2 At 165 pounds and in good physical condition, Lyons 
bore very little resemblance (other than race) to the victim’s descrip-
tion of her attacker.3 Nevertheless, Lyons was not surprised when police 
wanted to question him about the rape.4 The attacker was a black male 
 
1 Know the Cases: Marcus Lyons, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/Marcus_Lyons.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). 
2 Gerry Smith, Rape Conviction Gone, Stigma Isn’t, Chi. Trib., Oct. 22, 2007, at 1. 
3 See Know the Cases: Marcus Lyons, supra note 1. 
4 Smith, supra note 2. 
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and Lyons was the only black male in the complex.5 Although he main-
tained that he was home at the time of the incident, police put his pho-
tograph into a photo array and showed it to the victim, who identified 
Lyons as the assailant.6 The other five photographs were mug shots, 
whereas the picture of Lyons showed him in a shirt and tie.7 Five days 
later, police conducted a live lineup, in which Lyons was the only mem-
ber repeated from the photo lineup.8 He was again identified as the 
attacker, but only after the victim requested to view the lineup a second 
time.9 The victim would also later identify him at trial.10 Lyons was con-
victed and sentenced to six years in prison, despite a lack of any other 
substantial evidence against him.11 
 In 2007, after three years in prison and sixteen years on parole as a 
registered sex offender, Marcus Lyons was exonerated by DNA evi-
dence.12 He was granted clemency and his record was expunged.13 He 
also received a small amount of compensation from the state.14 Despite 
the success of his petition, Lyons is still haunted by his time in prison 
and believes that that no amount of compensation will return to him 
what he lost.15 “You never forget the sound of a cell door closing on 
you,” he said.16 
 Marcus Lyons’s story is not unique.17 Mistaken eyewitness identifi-
cation is the leading cause of erroneous convictions in the United 
States, playing a role in more than seventy-five percent of convictions 
overturned by DNA evidence.18 But those who are exonerated are the 
                                                                                                                      
5 Id. 
6 Id.; Know the Cases: Marcus Lyons, supra note 1. 
7 Know the Cases: Marcus Lyons, supra note 1. Police had to use a picture from Lyons’s 
work identification badge because he had no criminal record. Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Smith, supra note 2; Know the Cases: Marcus Lyons, supra note 1. 
10 Know the Cases: Marcus Lyons, supra note 1. 
11 Id.; see Smith, supra note 2. 
12 Know the Cases: Marcus Lyons, supra note 1. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See Smith, supra note 2. 
16 Id. 
17 See, e.g., Steve McGonigle & Jennifer Emily, A Blind Faith in Eyewitnesses: 18 Dallas 
County Cases Overturned by DNA Relied Heavily on Eyewitness Testimony, Dall. Morning News, 
Oct. 12, 2008, at 1A; Joe Swickard, After Nearly 26 Years in Prison, Man to Go Free in Rape Case, 
Detriot Free Press, May 20, 2008, at 1. 
18 Eyewitness Misidentification, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). 
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lucky few.19 Although it is difficult to know the frequency with which 
innocent people are convicted on the basis of faulty eyewitness evi-
dence, researchers estimate approximately 4500 such convictions occur 
every year.20 
 Despite growing proof of the inaccuracy of traditional eyewitness 
identifications, eyewitnesses remain powerful tools for law enforcement 
as nearly 80,000 suspects are targeted each year based on eyewitness 
reports.21 For a prosecutor, a confident eyewitness provides invaluable 
evidence.22 As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, “There is almost 
nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, 
points a finger at the defendant and says, ‘That’s the one.’”23 Thus, al-
though eyewitness testimony may be among the least reliable forms of 
evidence, it is often the most compelling.24 Jurors are generally un-
aware of the weaknesses of eyewitness testimony and tend to believe it 
even in the face of other more credible evidence.25 
 Recognizing that eyewitness identifications are especially suscepti-
ble to error, the legal system has attempted to address the problem in 
several ways.26 The Supreme Court has held that the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution afford criminal defendants cer-
tain protections against unfairly suggestive police lineup procedures.27 
Many inaccurate identifications are caused not by any police actions, 
however, but rather by psychological factors that affect perception and 
memory.28 The Supreme Court’s decisions in the criminal procedure 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Kathy Pezdek, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Memory and Identification, in Expert 
Psychological Testimony for the Courts 99, 99 (Mark Costanzo et al. eds., 2007). 
20 See id. 
21 See A.G. Goldstein et al., Frequency of Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases: A Survey 
of Prosecutors, 27 Bull. Psychonomic Soc’y 71, 73 (1989). 
22 See McGonigle & Emily, supra note 17 (quoting Dallas Assistant District Attorney 
Kevin Brooks, “Eyewitness testimony was gold. If a witness said they saw it, they saw it.”). 
23 See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (quoting Elizabeth Loftus, Eye-
witness Testimony 19 (1979)). 
24 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (stating that stranger identifica-
tions are “proverbially untrustworthy”); McGonigle & Emily, supra note 17. 
25 See Jennifer Devenport et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense 
Evaluations, 2 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 338, 347 (1997); infra notes 119–123 and accom-
panying text. 
26 See infra notes 102–187 and accompanying text. 
27 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967) (holding that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prevents the introduction of an identifi-
cation that is the result of suggestive police procedures); Wade, 388 U.S. at 236–37 (deter-
mining that the defendant has a right to have his counsel present at a post-indictment 
lineup). 
28 See infra notes 51–78 and accompanying text. 
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area do little to address the challenge of communicating to the jury the 
problems with eyewitness testimony generally.29 Thus, courts have rec-
ognized the need to use other evidentiary and procedural mecha-
nisms.30 
 The two principal methods used are expert testimony and cau-
tionary jury instructions.31 Although the use of expert testimony is be-
coming more prevalent, the admissibility of such testimony remains 
within the discretion of the trial court and courts have been far from 
consistent.32 Furthermore, there are serious administrability and fair-
ness concerns regarding the use of eyewitness experts.33 Most courts 
now allow some form of cautionary jury instructions on eyewitness evi-
dence, the majority of which are modeled after the instruction set forth 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the 
1972 case of United States v. Telfaire.34 As with expert testimony, appellate 
courts rarely disturb trial courts’ determinations as to whether and how 
to give eyewitness jury instructions.35 Given that appellate courts show 
such a high level of deference to trial courts in this area, it is important 
that the approaches trial courts take are effective, because absent the 
discovery of new evidence, the trial is the last chance most defendants 
will have to prove their innocence.36 
 This Note critiques the common approaches courts currently em-
ploy in educating jurors about the fallibility of eyewitness identifications 
and proposes a new approach.37 Part I outlines the factors that can af-
fect the accuracy of eyewitnesses.38 It discusses psychological factors 
affecting memory and perception and systematic factors that can create 
bias and lead to inaccuracy.39 Part II explains the legal system’s re-
                                                                                                                      
29 See infra notes 115–127 and accompanying text. 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 556, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (pro-
posing model eyewitness jury instruction); State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1221–23, 1224 
(Ariz. 1983) (holding that it may be reversible error for a trial judge to refuse to admit 
eyewitness expert testimony). 
31 See infra notes 128–187 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 128–158 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 195–228 and accompanying text. 
34 See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558–59; see also infra notes 181–187 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 165–180 and accompanying text. This Note uses the terms “eyewitness 
instructions” and “eyewitness jury instructions” as shorthand for “cautionary jury instruc-
tions on eyewitness evidence.” 
36 See generally Smith, supra note 2 (describing the rare circumstance where a defendant is 
later exonerated by DNA evidence); see also infra notes 115–187 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 188–331 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 47–96 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 51–96 and accompanying text. 
2011] Eyewitness Identification Jury Instructions 655 
sponse to the problem.40 It looks at the constitutional protections af-
forded to criminal defendants and then delves more deeply into evi-
dentiary mechanisms—expert testimony and jury instructions.41 Part 
III argues that jury instructions are preferable to expert testimony be-
cause they do not significantly increase the length and cost of trial, they 
minimize prejudice, and unlike expert testimony, they do not discrimi-
nate against indigent defendants.42 Part IV looks at the current use of 
jury instructions and explains why the instructions currently in com-
mon use are ineffective.43 It focuses on three flaws: the failure of cur-
rent instructions to dispel erroneous assumptions; the inadequate and 
confusing content of common eyewitness instructions; and the timing 
of the instructions.44 Part V proposes a new approach.45 It argues that 
cautionary eyewitness jury instructions should be given before evidence 
is presented and proposes a model instruction that courts can adopt.46 
I. Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitnesses 
 An eyewitness’s memory of an event is not stored like an image or 
videotape that can simply be replayed upon request to produce a pre-
cise account of an event.47 Instead, the witness must reconstruct the 
event from memory, a process which involves numerous psychological 
processes.48 Section A of this Part discusses the impact of these various 
processes on eyewitness accuracy.49 Section B of this Part considers the 
effect of systematic factors on eyewitness reliability, focusing on the ways 
in which administration of lineups can, and often does create bias.50 
                                                                                                                      
40 See infra notes 97–187 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 97–187 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 188–228 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 229–262 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 229–262 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 263–331 and accompanying text. Although scholars have proposed 
model eyewitness jury instructions, the charge proposed in this Note is unique, and this 
Note urges judges to give the instruction prior to the testimony of the eyewitness. See, e.g., 
David E. Aaronson, Cross-Racial Identification of Defendants in Criminal Cases, Crim. Just., 
Spring 2008, at 4, 6. 
46 See infra notes 263–331 and accompanying text; infra app. 
47 See Richard Wise et al., How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitnesses in a Criminal Case, 42 
Conn. L. Rev. 435, 455 (2009). 
48 See infra notes 51–78 and accompanying text. 
49 See infra notes 51–78 and accompanying text. 
50 See infra notes 79–96 and accompanying text. 
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A. Psychological Factors Affecting Perception and Memory 
1. Perception 
 A witness’s perception is influenced both by the circumstances sur-
rounding the event observed (event factors) and peculiar characteris-
tics of the eyewitness, including physical limitations on senses and per-
sonal background or biases (witness factors).51 
 Event factors include basic considerations such as lighting condi-
tions, duration of the event, and physical proximity to the event.52 The 
degree of arousal and stress,53 the significance attributed to the event 
by the witness, and the level of violence involved can also significantly 
impact perception and subsequent memory retention of the event.54 
Generally, when a witness fails to perceive that a significant event is 
transpiring, the witness’s attention is likely not focused on the event.55 
Conversely, when a person appreciates the significance of the event, the 
person is likely to pay closer attention and is more apt to give an accu-
rate description when asked to recall the event.56 As a result, in the 
criminal context, accuracy of identification increases with the severity 
of the crime, so long as the crime is non-violent.57 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Henry Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of Eye-
witness Testimony, 2 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2007). The amount of sensory stimulation at the 
time of the initial observation can also impact the accuracy of subsequent identifications. 
Id. at 5. When an individual is exposed to a significant amount of information at once, he 
or she may experience “sensory overload,” which could impact the individual’s ability to 
perceive the events transpiring. Id. at 7. In fact, sensory overload could lead to so many 
gaps in perception that a witness could create or substitute false memories down the line 
to fill in those gaps. Id. 
52 See id. at 9. 
53 The Yerkes-Dodson Law posits that when stress levels are too low, people do not pay 
sufficient attention, and when stress levels are too high, the ability to concentrate and per-
ceive are negatively affected. See Robert Yerkes & John Dodson, The Relation of Strength of 
Stimulus to Rapidity of Habit Formation, 18 J. Comp. Neurology & Psychol. 459, 481 
(1908). As a result, perception and acquisition function most accurately when the witness 
is exposed to a moderate level of stress. See id. 
54 See Michael Leippe et al., Crime Seriousness as a Determinant of Accuracy in Eyewitness 
Identification, 63 J. Applied Psychol. 345, 349, 350–51 (1978); Elizabeth Loftus, Ten Years 
in the Life of an Expert Witness, 10 Law & Hum. Behav. 241, 254 (1986); Charles A. Morgan 
et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense 
Stress, 27 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 265, 275, 276, 277 (2004); Frederick Chemay, Note, Un-
reliable Eyewitness Evidence: The Expert Psychologist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 La. L. 
Rev. 721, 728 (1985). 
55 See Chemay, supra note 54, at 728. 
56 See Leippe et al., supra note 54, at 349. 
57 See id.; Loftus, supra note 54, at 254. 
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 If the crime involves violence, however, the witness’s ability to con-
centrate and perceive can be negatively affected.58 When an observer is 
concerned about personal safety, which is likely for a witness to a vio-
lent event, the observer tends to focus attention on the details per-
ceived as most directly affecting the observer’s safety, such as “blood, 
masks, weapons, and other aggressive actions.”59 In this context, an ob-
server generally pays less attention to other details of the crime scene, 
including the physical characteristics of the perpetrator.60 
 An individual’s perception can also be influenced by the individ-
ual’s own background and any expectations or stereotypes the individ-
ual may have.61 Cultural biases, personal prejudices, education, train-
ing, and prior experiences all affect how an individual processes 
sensory data.62 Evidence suggests that some people may actually incor-
porate their stereotype of a “criminal” into their identifications of sus-
pects.63 Along similar lines, a witness is much more likely to accurately 
identify someone of the same race than someone of a different race.64 
2. Retention and Retrieval 
 The accuracy of an identification can also be negatively impacted 
during the retention and retrieval phases of memory.65 With regard to 
the retention phase, in which the witness commits the information to 
                                                                                                                      
58 See Fradella, supra note 51, at 11. 
59 See Curt R. Bartol & Anne M. Bartol, Psychology and Law 233 (3d ed. 2004). 
60 See Fradella, supra note 51, at 12. 
61 See Chemay, supra note 54, at 726–27. 
62 See id. 
63 See Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony 37–38 (1996); Fradella, supra note 
51, at 12–13. In one experiment, a “semidramatic” photograph was shown to a wide variety 
of subjects. Loftus, supra, at 37–38. The photograph showed several people sitting in a 
subway car, with a black man standing and conversing with a white man, who was also 
standing, but holding a razor. Id. Over half of the subjects reported that the black man had 
been holding the razor and several described the man as “brandishing it wildly.” Id. 
64 See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 
Cornell L. Rev. 934 (1984) (explaining that witnesses in criminal trials will make more 
errors in cross-racial identifications than in same-race identifications); Roy Malpass & Je-
rome Kravitz, Recognition of Faces of Own and Other Race, 13 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 
330 (1969). Roy Malpass and Jerome Kravitz compared recognition and memory of identi-
fication of other persons among students at Howard University and the University of Illi-
nois. Malpass & Kravitz, supra, at 330–31. Photographs of black and white males were 
shown to the students. Id. Subjects recognized faces of their own race better than faces of 
the other race. See id. at 332–33. Interestingly, white students were far more likely to mis-
identify black students, than were blacks to misidentify whites. See id. at 332, 333. 
65 See Fradella, supra note 51, at 7–8. 
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memory, the amount of data to be retained and the retention interval66 
are two leading factors that can disrupt accuracy.67 Another less obvious 
factor is the effect of post-event misinformation.68 A witness’s exposure 
to newly released information can dramatically affect memory and lead 
a witness to falsely accept misinformation.69 Not only can such expo-
sure cause a witness to enhance existing memories, but it can also 
change a witness’s memory and cause non-existent details to become 
incorporated into that memory.70 
                                                                                                                     
 In the retrieval phase, when the witness describes what he or she 
observed to police or a court, a phenomenon known as “unconscious 
transference”71 can occur, in which different memory images become 
combined with one another.72 As a result, the witness confuses a person 
observed in an unrelated instance with the person seen at the event in 
question, leading the witness to mistakenly identify an innocent indi-
vidual as the perpetrator.73 
3. The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence and Accuracy 
 Perhaps most troubling for the criminal justice system is that there 
is very little correlation between an eyewitness’s expressed confidence in 
an identification and its actual accuracy.74 People generally tend to 
overestimate the accuracy of their own observations and memories and 
 
66 Retention interval refers to the time that passes between acquisition of the informa-
tion and retrieval. Id. at 7. 
67 See id. 
68 See Peter Cohen, How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
and Eyewitness Identification, 16 Pace L. Rev. 237, 246 (1996); Felicity Jenkins & Graham 
Davies, Contamination of Facial Memory Through Exposure to Misleading Composite Pictures, 70 J. 
Applied Psychol. 164, 173 (1985). 
69 See Fradella, supra note 51, at 8. For example, a person who witnesses a traffic acci-
dent may subsequently read a newspaper article stating that police believed that the opera-
tor of the vehicle was intoxicated. See Cohen, supra note 68, at 246. 
70 See Cohen, supra note 68, at 246 (citing Loftus, supra note 63, at 55). 
71 See Elizabeth Loftus, Unconscious Transference, 2 Law & Psychol. Rev. 93, 97 (1976). 
72 See id. 
73 See, e.g., Andrew Wolfson, Grand Jury Clears Man of 3 Bank Robberies, Louisville Cou-
rier-Journal, Dec. 14, 2002, at 1A. Troy Rufra was charged with four bank robberies of 
supermarket bank branches. Id. He was implicated after a teller at one of the branches saw 
him at the supermarket and identified him as the man who had robbed her three weeks 
earlier. Id. Rufra’s case was dismissed for lack of evidence. Id. He patronized the super-
market one or two times a week and used the bank for occasional business, leading experts 
to believe that the teller may have remembered Rufra’s face from those previous encoun-
ters. See id. 
74 See Saul Kassin et al., Déjà Vu All Over Again: Elliot’s Critique of Eyewitness Experts, 18 
Law & Hum. Behav. 203, 206 (1994); Michael Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About 
Eyewitness Memory, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 909, 926–27 (1995). 
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are susceptible to having their confidence inflated by outside influ-
ences.75 As a result, certain interactions throughout the criminal justice 
process can actually serve to increase an eyewitness’s confidence without 
affecting the accuracy of the memory.76 For example, if after making an 
identification, an eyewitness is provided with feedback that he or she is a 
good witness and has picked out the “right guy,” the witness’s confi-
dence will be artificially inflated.77 Eyewitnesses are usually unaware that 
their confidence has been inflated and will report at trial that they have 
always held a high level of confidence in the identification.78 
B. Systematic Factors: The Effect of Lineup Procedures 
 The ways in which lineups and showups are administered can, and 
often do, create biases.79 Although a number of states have promul-
gated guidelines recommending the implementation of standardized 
identification procedures, lineup administration remains far from uni-
form.80 Thus, although many jurisdictions have taken steps toward en-
suring lineup fairness, three types of bias remain common: foil bias, 
instruction bias, and presentation bias.81 
 In a corporeal lineup, foil bias occurs when the other members 
share very few physical characteristics with the suspect, thus causing the 
suspect to stand out.82 Generally, the other participants in the lineup 
should be of the same race, should be similarly dressed, should be of 
similar height and weight, and should not have otherwise distinctive 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups 
and Photospreads, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 603, 627 (1998); Wise et al., supra note 47, at 458. 
76 See Wise et al., supra note 47, at 458–59; see also infra notes 79–96 and accompanying 
text. 
77 See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eye-
witnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psychol. 360, 374 
(1998); Wise et al., supra note 47, at 458–59. 
78 See Wells & Bradfield, supra note 77, at 373, 374. 
79 See Devenport et al., supra note 25, at 344; Fradella, supra note 51, at 15–18. The dif-
ference between a lineup and a showup is that a showup involves one-on-one con-
frontation. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1506 (9th ed. 2009). 
80 See Scott Ehlers, Eyewitness Identification: State Law Reform, Champion, Apr. 2005, at 
34. Problematically, courts have been reluctant to consider whether such guidelines were 
followed. See, e.g., Davis v. State, No. 2-04-519-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2111, at *6 (App. 
Mar. 16, 2006) (rejecting a claim of error where police did not follow the U.S. Department 
of Justice’s guidelines on identification procedures because the defendant presented no 
authority showing that such techniques are required, rather than merely suggested). 
81See infra notes 82–96 and accompanying text. 
82 See Devenport et al., supra note 25, at 344; Fradella, supra note 51, at 16. 
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features.83 They should all have similar hair styles and facial hair, and 
either all or none should have distinguishing tattoos.84 
 Bias can also arise when the officer in charge of the identification 
procedure gives instructions to the witness.85 In an unbiased lineup 
instruction, the officer would explicitly inform the witness that the sus-
pect may or may not be in the lineup, thereby reducing the risk that 
the witness would pick the individual who most closely resembles the 
culprit relative to others in the lineup.86 The officer would further in-
struct the witness that regardless of whether an identification is made, 
the witness should not speak to other witnesses regarding the lineup.87 
If the witness makes an identification, the officer should not provide 
any feedback as to whether the identified individual was, in fact, the 
suspect.88 In an ideal identification procedure, the officer administer-
ing the lineup or photo array would not know which individual was the 
suspect.89 Such a “double-blind” procedure would eliminate the risk of 
suggestive questioning of, or feedback to, the witness.90 
                                                                                                                      
83 See Fradella, supra note 51, at 16; Gary Wells & Eric Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: 
Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 765, 771 
(1995). 
84 See Donald Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide 
for Law Enforcement, 53 Ark. L. Rev. 231, 278 (2000). 
85 Leippe, supra note 74, at 916; Wells & Seelau, supra note 83, at 769. 
86 See Wells & Seelau, supra note 83, at 769; see also Nat’l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Trainer’s Manual for Law Enforcement 32 
(2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/nij/eyewitness/188678.pdf (setting forth model 
instructions to be given by the officer administering the lineup, including advising the 
witness that the person who committed the crime may or may not be present in the group 
of individuals). 
87 See Nat’l Inst. of Justice, supra note 86, at 34. 
88 See id. at 33. 
89 See Wells & Seelau, supra note 83, at 775. 
90 See Fradella, supra note 51, at 17; see also Steven Penrod, Eyewitness Identification Evi-
dence: How Well Are Witnesses and Police Performing?, 18 Crim. Just. 36, 45 (2003) (explaining 
that a double-blind procedure would eliminate the possibility that officers can intention-
ally or unintentionally communicate something to a witness about which member of a 
lineup is the suspect). Although courts have generally declined to order new line-up 
methodologies, one trial court, acknowledging the risk of bias when police officers know 
which lineup member is the suspect, ordered a lineup to be held sequentially and “double-
blind.” See In re Investigation of Rahim Thomas, 733 N.Y.S.2d 591, 597 (Crim Ct. 2001); 
Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn’t: Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of Cross-
Examination, 36 Stetson L. Rev. 727, 751 n.98 (2007); see also State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 
290, 318 (Conn. 2005) (requiring a jury instruction warning of the danger of misidentifi-
cation if police failed to instruct the eyewitness prior to administration of the lineup that 
the suspect “might or might not be present” in the lineup). 
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 Presentation bias occurs when lineup members are presented to 
the witness in a suggestive manner.91 Routine police practice is to pre-
sent all lineup members to the witness at the same time.92 This, how-
ever, creates a risk that the witness will make a relative decision by se-
lecting the lineup member who best resembles the perpetrator, at least 
in relation to the others in the lineup.93 Studies suggest that the better 
practice would be to present the participants sequentially.94 The witness 
would be asked to make a decision after viewing each individual, would 
not be allowed to go back to view a lineup member who had already 
been presented, and would not be told how many individuals would be 
presented.95 This sequential procedure would require the witness to 
perform a more recall-oriented task, comparing each individual solely 
with his or her memory, without the interference of the relative com-
parison to others in the lineup.96 
II. The Legal System’s Response 
 The legal system has attempted to address the risks presented by 
eyewitness testimony in several ways.97 Section A of this Part discusses 
constitutional protections for criminal defendants, specifically the right 
to the presence of counsel at post-indictment lineups and the inadmis-
sibility at trial of identifications that were the result of unnecessarily 
suggestive police procedures.98 Section B of this Part discusses the use 
of evidentiary mechanisms to educate jurors about the potential weak-
nesses of eyewitness testimony.99 It first looks at the admission of expert 
witnesses to testify about factors that can affect eyewitness perception 
and memory.100 Section B then discusses the use of special and model 
jury instructions on eyewitness identifications.101 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Devenport et al., supra note 25, at 345; Fradella, supra note 51, at 17. 
92 See In re Investigation of Rahim Thomas, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 593; Fradella, supra note 51, at 
17. 
93 See Devenport et al., supra note 25, at 345; Wells & Seelau, supra note 83, at 772. 
94 See Fradella, supra note 51, at 17; see also Memorandum from John J. Farmer, Jr., N.J. 
Att’y Gen., to All Cnty. Prosecutors et al. 1 (Apr. 18, 2001), available at http://www.state.nj. 
us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf (specifying sequential lineups as a measure police should 
take to minimize potential bias). 
95 See Devenport et al., supra note 25, at 344. 
96 See id. at 345; Fradella, supra note 51, at 17. 
97 See infra notes 102–187 and accompanying text. 
98 See infra notes 102–114 and accompanying text. 
99 See infra notes 115–187 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra notes 128–158 and accompanying text. 
101 See infra notes 159–187 and accompanying text. 
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A. Constitutional Protections for Criminal Defendants:  
Right to Counsel and Due Process 
 Recognizing that unfairly suggestive police procedures can lead to 
erroneous identifications, the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated, in 
light of modern police procedures, two constitutional protections for 
criminal suspects.102 First, the Court held in 1967 in United States v. 
Wade, that a defendant has the right to the presence of counsel at a 
post-indictment lineup.103 The Court reasoned that because a lineup is 
a critical stage of the prosecution and is thus something that could af-
fect the outcome of trial, the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s 
right to have counsel present.104 The attorney’s presence helps to serve 
two purposes: preventing intentional or incidental prejudice to the 
suspect during the lineup, and ensuring that any irregularities that oc-
curred during the lineup procedure can be reconstructed at trial in 
order to mount a meaningful cross-examination of the eyewitness.105 
The exclusionary rule106 applies to violations of this right and makes 
inadmissible a post-indictment identification made without counsel 
present.107 The Court has subsequently put significant limitations on 
the right articulated in Wade.108 A suspect has no right to counsel at a 
pre-indictment lineup and no right to counsel when a witness is shown 
a photo array.109 Because many lineups take place early in the proc-
ess— during the investigative stage—and police often use photo arrays 
                                                                                                                      
102 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 236–37 (1967). 
103 388 U.S. at 236–37. 
104 Id. 
105 See id. at 230–31, 236. 
106 The “exclusionary rule” states that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitu-
tion is inadmissible against a defendant in a criminal trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
648 (1961). 
107 Wade, 388 U.S. at 240. The Court also held, however, that even if a pretrial identifi-
cation is suppressed, the witness may be able to take the stand and testify at trial. Id. at 241. 
If the prosecution can establish that the in-court identification was independently based 
on another source, such as original observations made at the time of the crime, it is admis-
sible. See id. This ignores the very real possibility that the witness is no longer recalling the 
defendant from her memory of the incident, but rather identifying the defendant as the 
perpetrator because he is who she identified at the lineup or showup. See id. 
108 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973); Illinois v. Kirby, 406 U.S. 682, 690 
(1972). 
109 Ash, 413 U.S. at 321 (no right to counsel at photo array); Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690 (no 
right to counsel at pre-indictment lineup). 
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before assembling a lineup at all, the Wade doctrine is of limited value 
to criminal suspects.110 
                                                                                                                     
 Second, criminal defendants also receive protection with regard to 
identifications under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.111 The Supreme Court has held that unnecessarily suggestive pro-
cedures violate a criminal defendant’s right to due process of law guar-
anteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.112 In 1967 in Stovall 
v. Denno, the Court stated that an identification that is the result of sug-
gestive police procedures is inadmissible unless the circumstances ne-
cessitated such a procedure.113 The Court has since retreated from a 
firm application of the rule, holding that even if an identification is the 
result of unnecessarily suggestive procedures, it may still be admissible 
if it possesses certain indicia of reliability that reduce the possibility of 
mistaken identification.114 
B. Evidentiary Mechanisms: Expert Testimony and Jury Instructions 
 Although Wade and Stovall115 may have provided some protections 
to criminal defendants when mistaken identifications are the result of 
coercive or suggestive police procedures, those decisions did little to 
address the challenge of communicating to the jury the weaknesses of 
eyewitness testimony generally.116 Many inaccurate identifications are 
not so because of any actions of the police, but rather are influenced by 
psychological factors that affect perception and memory.117 Because 
such identifications are not excluded under Wade, the eyewitness is put 
 
110 See Ash, 413 U.S. at 321; Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690; see also Kirby, 406 U.S. at 699 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that police conduct pre-indictment lineups to ensure 
that the suspect is, in fact, the offender). 
111 See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301–02. 
112 Id. at 302. 
113 Id. at 295, 302 (ruling that a procedure in which a handcuffed suspect was brought 
into a potential victim’s hospital room by police and the victim was asked if the defendant 
was “the man” was not unnecessarily suggestive because the police were not sure whether 
the victim was going to survive and had to act quickly to obtain the identification). 
114 See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111–14 (1977). In Neil v. Biggers in 1972, the 
Court articulated several factors to be considered in assessing the reliability of the identifi-
cation: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime; 
(2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of 
the perpetrator; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation; and (5) the 
elapsed time between the crime and the confrontation. 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972). 
115 Wade, 388 U.S. at 218; Stovall, 388 U.S. at 293. A third case decided along with Wade 
and Stovall in 1967, Gilbert v. California, is often included in what is referred to as the “Wade 
trilogy.” Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
116 See infra notes 117–-127 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra notes 51–78 and accompanying text. 
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before the jury for its evaluation.118 Unfortunately, there are strong in-
dications that the average juror tends to believe eyewitness testimony 
even in the face of other more credible evidence.119 In fact, although 
eyewitness testimony may be the least reliable type of evidence, it is of-
ten the most compelling.120 Because much of the scientific knowledge 
regarding eyewitness accuracy is counterintuitive, lay jurors usually lack 
the capacity to effectively evaluate the eyewitness’s testimony.121 Evi-
dence suggests that jurors are especially unaware of the effect of crime 
seriousness on perception ability, the inherent unreliability of cross-
racial identifications, and that there is little correlation between witness 
confidence and accuracy.122 In fact, studies have shown that eyewitness 
confidence, poor predictor as it is of accuracy, is often the most impor-
tant factor that the jury relies on when evaluating the eyewitness testi-
mony.123 
 Thus, the challenge for the legal system is to find a way to educate 
jurors and enable them to make more informed decisions without cre-
ating prejudice that will cause them to disregard accurate and reliable 
                                                                                                                      
118 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 240. 
119 See Devenport et al., supra note 25, at 346–53 (discussing numerous psychological 
studies that examined juror sensitivities to witnessing factors). In juror surveys, respon-
dents appeared to be somewhat sensitive to the influence of cross-racial problems and 
prior photo array bias, but were less sensitive to the detrimental effects of age and reten-
tion interval. Id. at 346. Also, in contrast with psychological findings, most respondents 
believed that there was a correlation between a witness’s confidence and her accuracy. Id. 
at 347. Mock trial research further suggests that jurors are poor at differentiating accurate 
and inaccurate eyewitness. Id. at 348. In one study, among jurors exposed to non-leading 
cross-examination of the witness, 76% correctly identified accurate eyewitnesses, but only 
14% correctly determined which eyewitnesses were inaccurate; among jurors exposed to 
leading cross-examination, 84% correctly identified accurate eyewitnesses and 27% cor-
rectly determined which witnesses were inaccurate. Id. (citing Gary Wells et al., Accuracy, 
Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. Applied Psychol. 440, 440–
48 (1979)). 
120 See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 351 (1981); Wade, 388 U.S. at 228. 
121 See Devenport et al., supra note 25, at 347–48, 349; Fradella, supra note 51, at 24. 
122 See Devenport et al., supra note 25, at 347–48. Problematically, some courts have al-
lowed testimony that emphasizes witness confidence and suggests that it is a good predic-
tor of the accuracy of the identification. See Jones v. State, 539 S.E.2d 143, 148 (Ga. 2000) 
(permitting eyewitnesses to testify that they were certain in their identification of the de-
fendant, because the scientific research suggesting that there was no correlation between 
confidence and accuracy did not demonstrate that every eyewitness’s confidence as to 
accuracy was misplaced, and emphasizing that eyewitness confidence has always been 
deemed a relevant factor in considering an eyewitness’s testimony); Nero v. State, 798 A.2d 
5, 18, 19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (allowing a detective to testify that the victim and eye-
witness were certain of their identification of the defendant in photo arrays). 
123 See Wells et al., supra note 75, at 620. 
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eyewitnesses.124 There is a growing recognition that existing safeguards, 
especially cross-examination, are inadequate to reveal the influence of 
specific psychological factors that affect perception and memory.125 
Although a skillful cross-examination may be effective in exposing a 
dishonest or biased witness, a cross-examining lawyer is ill equipped to 
confront an honest but mistaken witness who, because she is giving tes-
timony she believes to be true, will not display the demeanor of some-
one who is lying.126 The two mechanisms most frequently suggested to 
educate jurors about the underlying psychology are expert scientific 
testimony and jury instructions.127 
1. Expert Testimony 
 One option that a number of states have deployed to educate ju-
rors about the fallibility of eyewitnesses is to permit an expert psycholo-
gist to testify as to the factors that affect accuracy.128 Commentators 
have long urged courts to move in this direction and, in the 1980s, 
some courts began to admit eyewitness experts.129 In the 1983 case of 
State v. Chapple, the Arizona Supreme Court made what was, at the time, 
the strongest endorsement of this form of expert testimony, holding 
that it could be reversible error for a trial judge to refuse to admit eye-
witness expert testimony.130 The court pointed out that, although eye-
witness weakness in general might be a matter of common knowledge, 
the expert would have provided a specific explanation of particular var-
iables relevant to the case.131 The court explained that by providing this 
                                                                                                                      
124 See infra notes 128–187 and accompanying text. 
125 See Epstein, supra note 90, at 766, 774–80. 
126 See id. at 766. 
127 See infra notes 128–187 and accompanying text. 
128 See infra notes 129–158 and accompanying text. 
129 See State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 (Ariz. 1983); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 
709, 726 (Cal. 1984). 
130 See 660 P.2d at 1224. 
131 Id. at 1220–21. The expert would have testified regarding the following factors: (1) 
the “forgetting” curve due to the delay in identification and because one witness had ear-
lier indicated someone else was the culprit; (2) the effect of stress upon accuracy; (3) un-
conscious transference; (4) the tendency to assimilate post-event information, where in-
formation gained after the event is factored into an identification to make it “fit”; (5) the 
“feedback factor,” which could occur when witnesses have discussed their observations; 
and (6) that there is no relationship between a witness’s confidence in the identification 
and the accuracy of the identification. Id. 
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information to the jury, the expert would assist jurors in making an in-
formed and fair decision.132 
 At the time Chapple was decided, federal courts still followed the 
general rule that eyewitness expert testimony is usually inadmissible 
because the unreliability of eyewitnesses is not outside the understand-
ing of the common juror.133 In 1985, however, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit revisited the issue in United States v. Downing 
and held that in appropriate cases, an eyewitness expert can indeed 
assist the trier of fact, and thus the expert’s testimony is admissible un-
der the Federal Rules of Evidence.134 The court noted that the Federal 
Rules’ basic approach to opinion testimony is one of “helpfulness.”135 
An expert would be helpful to the jury, the court determined, because 
many of the factors the expert would testify to went beyond common 
knowledge and some actually directly contradicted common sense.136 
The court further observed that the expert might be able to refute ju-
rors’ erroneous assumptions about eyewitness reliability.137 Advocates 
contend that such “social framework” expert testimony, in which an 
expert provides a context for evaluating the information in an eyewit-
ness report, is the best way to ensure that jurors are receiving all of the 
information they need to make an informed decision.138 
 Although the use of expert testimony is becoming more prevalent, 
the admissibility decision remains discretionary and courts have been 
far from consistent in their admission of such evidence.139 Appellate 
                                                                                                                      
 
132 Id. at 1221. Just two years later, however, the Arizona Supreme Court remained true 
to its warning in Chapple that it did not intend to “open the gates to a flood of expert evi-
dence on the subject” and would continue to support trial courts’ discretionary rulings 
unless presented with a case where expert testimony was needed by upholding the exclu-
sion of expert testimony where there was substantial other evidence in the state’s case. See 
State v. Poland, 698 P.2d 183, 194 (Ariz. 1985); cf. Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1224. 
133 See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973). The court ar-
ticulated a four-prong test for the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identifications: (1) qualified expert; (2) testifies on a proper subject, that is, about affairs 
not within the understanding of the average man; (3) by means of a generally accepted 
explanatory theory; and (4) probative value of testimony must outweigh prejudicial effect. 
Id. In holding the testimony inadmissible, the court expressed concerns about the negative 
impact of expert testimony on the jury. See id. at 1152. This concern remains one of the 
core reasons trial courts cite for excluding expert testimony today. See infra notes 142–147 
and accompanying text. 
134 753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3rd Cir. 1985); see Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
135 Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1229. 
136 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1230–31. 
137 Id. at 1231 (quoting United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
138 See Fradella, supra note 51, at 24; Leippe, supra note 74, at 909, 948–49. 
139 Compare United States v. Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d 55, 72 (1st Cir. 2009) (uphold-
ing an exclusion of testimony on the basis that it would involve a credibility determina-
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courts have tried to articulate factors for trial courts to consider when 
determining whether to admit eyewitness expert testimony, but judges 
often reach different conclusions as to admissibility in cases presenting 
relatively similar factual scenarios.140 Underlying this inconsistency 
seems to be a general hostility on the part of judges toward allowing a 
witness to comment on the reliability of eyewitness testimony, something 
that has been the touchstone of the criminal justice system throughout 
its history.141 
 Courts have cited several rationales for excluding expert testimony 
on eyewitness reliability.142 The most commonly asserted reason is that 
the testimony would usurp the role of the jury as the sole arbiter of the 
credibility of witnesses.143 Courts often rule that because a reliability 
determination is to be made by jurors, using their common sense and 
experience, it is an improper subject for expert testimony.144 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court articulated this view succinctly, holding that 
expert testimony purporting to educate jurors on the possible factors 
                                                                                                                      
tion), with Ex parte Williams, 594 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Ala. 1992) (upholding an exclusion of 
similar testimony on different grounds—that the expert was not familiar with the specific 
facts of the case); compare Bomas v. State, 956 A.2d 215, 218 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) 
(explaining that the trial court excluded eyewitness expert testimony because the testi-
mony failed the U.S. Supreme Court’s test for admission of scientific evidence), with Peo-
ple v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 378 (N.Y. 2007) (reversing the trial court’s exclusion of 
eyewitness expert testimony and concluding that the proffered testimony satisfied the Su-
preme Court’s scientific evidence test). A majority of states and federal courts leave the 
decision of whether to admit expert testimony within the discretion of the trial court. See, 
e.g., Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d at 72; Ex parte Williams, 594 So. 2d at 1227; Bomas, 956 A.2d 
at 218. Most courts vested with such discretion, however, generally exclude the evidence. 
See, e.g., State v. Kemp, 507 A.2d 1387, 1390 (Conn. 1986); McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 
368, 371 (Fla. 1998); State v. Ammons, 305 N.W.2d 812, 814–15 (Neb. 1981). 
140 See LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 378 (suggesting that a judge’s determination as to 
whether a case turns entirely on identification is a key inquiry); State v. Cheatam, 81 P.3d 
830, 842 (Wash. 2003) (outlining factors to be considered by the trial court). 
141 See State v. Nordstrom, 25 P.3d 717, 730–31 (Ariz. 2001) (upholding a trial court’s 
decision to prohibit an expert from commenting on an eyewitness’s testimony or address-
ing specifics of the case); see also United States v. Bellamy, 26 F. App’x 250, 259 (4th Cir. 
2002) (remarking that an expert’s testimony was particularly objectionable because it was 
based on a mistaken assumption about the identification procedure). 
142 See infra notes 143–155 and accompanying text. 
143 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 519 S.E.2d 221, 229 (Ga. 1999); People v. Kelley, 631 
N.Y.S.2d 926, 926 (App. Div. 1995); State v. Butterfield, 27 P.3d 1133, 1146 (Utah 2001). 
144 See Johnson, 519 S.E.2d at 229. Some commentators even argue that not only does 
expert testimony usurp the role of the jury as the judge of credibility, but that it is inconsis-
tent with the objectives of the jury system as it undermines the jury function of community 
representation. Steven Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 
40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 165, 173–74, 217 (1990). Professor Steven Friedland argues that 
the jury system is the “backbone of the American criminal process” and that system relies 
heavily on juror common sense for its continued validity. Id. at 170, 176–77. 
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that may affect a person’s perception is improper as it would intrude 
upon the jury’s basic function of deciding credibility.145 The court ex-
plained that an ordinary juror was able to assess credibility and give ap-
propriate weight to the testimony.146 A court is especially likely to disal-
low an expert’s testimony if it appears that the expert is commenting 
on the reliability of a specific witness in the case.147 
 A second reason often cited by courts in declining to admit an 
eyewitness expert is that the prejudicial effect of the testimony would 
outweigh its probative value.148 The concern is that the testimony could 
be misleading and cause jurors to give disproportionate weight to the 
expert’s testimony at the expense of the eyewitness’s testimony.149 
 A third reason commonly advanced by courts for declining to ad-
mit eyewitness experts is that traditional devices, such as cross-
examination and attorney argument, are sufficient to expose weaknesses 
in eyewitness identifications.150 Cross-examination specifically has long 
been lauded for its ability to expose untruths.151 Thus, in excluding ex-
pert testimony, courts often note that defendants who wish to attack the 
reliability of eyewitness perception, memory, and recollection are free to 
use the “powerful tool of cross-examination to do so.”152 Commentators 
                                                                                                                      
 
145 Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662 A.2d 621, 630–31 (Pa. 1995). 
146 Id. at 631. 
147 See LaPointe v. State, 214 P.3d 684, 695 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that an ex-
pert’s proffered testimony was improper because he sought to tell a jury that a good eye-
witness would promptly pick a suspect from a photo lineup (the witness in the case did 
not) and that observations under stress are always less accurate than observations not un-
der stress, rather than explaining that studies show stress has the ability to negatively affect 
a person’s ability to perceive); see also Farris v. State, 818 N.E.2d 63, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 
(excluding defense-proffered expert testimony where the expert sought to testify that in 
[his] opinion, “there [were] enough potential sources of error . . . to make [him] question 
the veracity of [the witness’s] statements”). 
148 See, e.g., Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d at 72; State v. Cole, 556 S.E.2d 666, 670 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
149 See Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d at 72. Critics, however, argue that evidentiary rules 
speak only to “unfair prejudice” and, although expert testimony would undoubtedly create 
prejudice in that it would provide jurors with more information than they previously had, 
the resulting prejudice is not only fair and reasonable, but desirable. See Leippe, supra note 
74, at 922. 
150 See infra notes 151–153 and accompanying text. 
151 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (explaining that cross-examination 
exposes falsehoods and elicits the truth of a criminal case). According to Jeremy Bentham, 
the “grand security” against erroneous testimony is cross-examination. 5 Jeremy Bentham, 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence Specifically Applied to English Practice 212 (Lon-
don, Hunt & Clark 1827). 
152 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997). In State v. 
Shomberg in 2006, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the expert had been properly 
excluded because defense counsel was able to adequately explore the factors influencing 
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have sharply criticized such judicial reasoning, arguing that tools de-
signed to expose a witness’s bias and dishonesty cannot expose the risk 
of inaccuracy of a witness who testifies honestly but is mistaken.153 
 Finally, courts have expressed concerns about the effect that a pa-
rade of experts would have on both the individual trial and the justice 
system more broadly.154 Although not often explicitly stated, a concern 
about high costs is likely implicit in many courts’ decisions to exclude 
the testimony.155 
 Appellate courts show tremendous deference to trial judges in de-
termining admissibility of experts and will rarely find that the exclusion 
of eyewitness expert testimony constitutes reversible error.156 Where 
appellate courts do reverse a trial court’s exclusion of such expert tes-
timony, most or all of the following circumstances are generally pre-
sent: the identification of the defendant was a critical issue in the state’s 
case; there was little or no other evidence corroborating the eyewitness 
testimony and thus the case turned largely on the credibility of the 
eyewitness; there was evidence that a specific factor was at play in the 
case (for example, cross-racial identification); and the expert provided 
a particularized explanation that would assist the jury in sorting out the 
                                                                                                                      
the reliability of eyewitness identifications by cross-examining a testifying witness and de-
livering effective opening statements and closing arguments. 709 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Wis. 
2006). The defendant requested that the expert be allowed to testify as to the “relative 
reliability of sequential versus simultaneous lineups,” unconscious transference, and the 
absence of a relationship between confidence and accuracy, and to provide examples of 
people wrongly convicted based on mistaken identifications. Id. The trial court rejected 
defense counsel’s argument that cross-examination and closing arguments could not ex-
plain the significance of such factors. See id. at 375–76. 
153 See Epstein, supra note 90, at 766. Professor Jules Epstein explains that the inaccu-
racy of cross-racial identifications cannot be effectively explored because witnesses are 
likely to think, when confronted with the question, that they are being accused of preju-
dice against members of another race and will deny that they are less able to identify 
members of that race. See id. at 775–76. Similarly, it is difficult to elicit the negative effect 
of stress, violence, or the presence of a weapon, because the witness is likely to insist that 
because of the violence or stress involved, he or she will never forget the observed event. 
See id. at 778. As a result, questioning on the subject can actually increase the perceived 
accuracy of the eyewitness’s testimony. Id. at 776–78. 
154 See, e.g., Hampton v. State, 285 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Wis. 1979). 
155 See id. 
156 See, e.g., Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d at 71 (stating that admission of eyewitness expert 
testimony is a matter of case-by-case discretion); Bomas, 956 A.2d at 218 (explaining that 
the determination of whether to admit expert testimony concerning the reliability of eye-
witness testimony “lies within the sound discretion of the trial court” and will not be dis-
turbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion). 
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facts.157 Absent these circumstances, an appellate court will likely up-
hold a trial court’s refusal to admit an eyewitness expert.158 
2. Jury Instructions 
 Another way to educate jurors about the inherent unreliability of 
eyewitness identifications is to provide a jury instruction on the top-
ic.159 Courts have articulated several reasons for requiring, or at least 
permitting, model or special jury instructions about eyewitness identifi-
cation.160 Courts often point out that jurors are unaware of many fac-
tors affecting the reliability of eyewitnesses and that general credibility 
instructions do not educate the jury as to many key factors that make 
eyewitness testimony vulnerable.161 In 1972, in United States v. Telfaire, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ex-
plained that the special difficulties often presented by identification 
testimony may require that additional information be given to focus the 
jury’s attention on the issue of identity.162 Failure to give an instruction 
in appropriate cases, the court said, would present a serious risk of 
wrongful convictions based on erroneous identifications.163 Further-
more, courts instruct jurors on special precautions they should take in 
                                                                                                                      
157 See LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 378 (holding that the trial court should weigh the de-
fendant’s request to admit expert testimony against factors “such as the centrality of the 
identification issue and the existence of corroborating evidence”); Weatherred v. State, 
985 S.W.2d 234, 238–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (finding reversible error where the iden-
tity of the defendant as the perpetrator was seriously contested, no other evidence was 
available to the defense to rebut the testimony of the state’s eyewitnesses, and the scientific 
testimony would include theories that had been scientifically tested and would be pre-
sented in a way that was not startling or spectacular); Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 555 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (noting that the psychologist answered questions about specific 
facts of the case and how they might be affected by factors as to which he testified); 
Cheatam, 81 P.3d at 842 (explaining that a trial court must consider whether the case in-
volves a specific subject to which the testimony relates, such as whether the victim and the 
defendant are of the same race, whether the defendant displayed a weapon, and the effect 
of stress). 
158 See Legrand, 867 N.E.2d at 378; Weatherred, 985 S.W.2d at 238–39; Jordan, 928 S.W.2d 
at 555; Cheatam, 81 P.3d at 842. 
159 See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 557, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
160 See infra notes 161–164 and accompanying text. 
161 See United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1118 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., con-
curring); Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 556 (noting that an additional eyewitness instruction may 
sometimes be warranted). 
162 469 F.2d at 556; see also People v. Hall, 616 P.2d 826, 835 (Cal. 1980) (holding that a 
court should give an instruction requested by the defendant that directs attention to evi-
dence from which a reasonable doubt of guilt could be engendered, including eyewitness 
identification). 
163 Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 557. 
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evaluating the credibility of accomplices, informants, alibi witnesses, 
and immunized witnesses, and some courts have found that “out of a 
sense of fairness, attention should also be drawn to the possible unreli-
ability of eyewitness testimony.”164 
 Although most courts now allow some form of eyewitness instruc-
tion, a minority still decline to give such a charge.165 Many of these 
courts have expressed a concern that a judge may be invading the prov-
ince of the jury by singling out a particular type of testimony and telling 
jurors to consider it with skepticism.166 It is argued that, once eyewit-
ness testimony is singled out, it would be very difficult for the prosecu-
tion to win cases that depend entirely on such testimony.167 This would 
particularly impact the government’s ability to successfully prosecute 
rapes and sexual assaults.168 
                                                                                                                     
 Courts have articulated several general approaches in deciding 
whether to require a trial court to give an eyewitness identification in-
struction.169 One view is that cautionary instructions that deal “realisti-
cally with the shortcomings and trouble-spots of the identification pro-
cess” are necessary in appropriate cases, particularly where the 
circumstances raise doubts about the legitimacy of the identification or 
where the case turns largely on the credibility of the eyewitness.170 In 
jurisdictions that have adopted an eyewitness instruction as part of their 
model instructions, courts have been willing to defer to the judicial or 
legislative assessment that guidance to the jury on the topic is war-
ranted and thus, have generally given the instruction.171 Nevertheless, 
even in jurisdictions that regularly instruct the jury as to the factors af-
fecting eyewitness reliability, such an instruction will generally only be 
 
164 See People v. Whalen, 451 N.E.2d 212, 214–15 (N.Y. 1983). 
165 See, e.g., Conley v. State 607 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ark. 1980); Lewis v. State, 363 N.E.2d 
1230, 1231 (Ind. 1977); Waller v. State, 581 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 
166 See Conley, 607 S.W.2d at 330; Waller, 581 S.W.2d at 484. 
167 See William Carroll & Michael Seng, Jury Instructions, in Eyewitness Testi-
mony: Strategy and Tactics § 9:5 (2d ed. 2009), available at Westlaw EYEWITTEST. 
168 See id. 
169 See infra notes 170–173 and accompanying text. 
170 See Brooks v. State, 380 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889, 893 (Mass. 1979); see also State v. Cotto, 865 A.2d 660, 665 (N.J. 
2005) (holding that failure to give an instruction on identification may constitute plain 
error). 
171 See, e.g., Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 769 (Ga. 2005). 
672 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:651 
given upon request.172 Almost all courts have held that the trial court 
does not have to issue an instruction sua sponte.173 
 Courts that have found cautionary identification instructions un-
necessary have done so for several reasons.174 First, some courts have 
held that an instruction is not necessary where the jury is adequately 
instructed concerning the credibility of witnesses generally.175 Second, 
a number of courts have found instructions unnecessary where the 
identification was corroborated or alternatively where the eyewitness 
testimony was “so equivocal as to make its fallibility self-evident.”176 
Courts have found there to be sufficient corroboration where other 
witnesses were able to place the defendant at the scene of the crime;177 
the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator was supported by his or 
her arrest in the geographic proximity of the place of offense shortly 
after its commission;178 and the prosecution’s case also involved testi-
mony of an accomplice.179 Courts have sometimes even found corrobo-
ration to be unnecessary when the case involves an identification that is 
not “dubious” and presents no significant risk of misidentification.180 
                                                                                                                      
 
172 See State v. Benjamin, 363 A.2d 762, 764 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976). 
173 See id. But see State v. Green, 430 A.2d 914, 919 (N.J. 1981) (ruling that the defen-
dant was entitled to an eyewitness identification instruction even though no instruction 
was formally requested by counsel, where counsel adequately raised the issue in an objec-
tion to the court’s instructions as given); People v. Hall, 439 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (App. Div. 
1981) (emphasizing the appellate court’s interest in ensuring justice and holding that, 
under the circumstances, the trial court’s failure to give an identification jury charge was 
reversible error, even though defense counsel did not request such an instruction). 
174 See infra notes 175–180 and accompanying text. 
175 See Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017, 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Even in cases 
where the facts seem to lend themselves to a special instruction, courts have held no such 
instruction necessary where the jury was instructed to weigh the evidence and credibility 
in light of their observations and experience. See Lenoir v. State, 72 S.W.3d 899, 903, 905 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2002). In Lenoir, the case involved a Caucasian witness, who identified the 
defendant as the murder perpetrator, and described him as a light-complected black male, 
roughly five feet nine inches tall, with short hair. Id. at 903. The defendant was actually five 
feet six inches tall and claimed not to have had short hair at the time the crime was com-
mitted. Id. The court nevertheless held that a special identification instruction (including 
a cross-racial instruction) was not required because the jury was instructed as to evaluating 
the credibility of witnesses generally. Id. at 905. 
176 See United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 467–68, 469 (2nd Cir. 1976) (holding no 
cautionary instruction required where an eyewitness could not pick the defendant out of a 
lineup before trial and recognized the defendant only after seeing him outside the court-
room while the witness was waiting to testify because the unreliability of this identification 
would be “self-evident” to jurors). 
177 See Shields v. State, 397 So. 2d 184, 187 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981). 
178 See Taylor v. State, 276 S.E.2d 691, 692 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981). 
179 See United States v. Patterson, 150 F.3d 382, 388 (4th Cir. 1998). 
180 See United States v. Montelbano, 605 F.2d 56, 59 (2nd Cir. 1979) (reasoning that no 
special instruction was necessary because the eyewitness sat next to the defendant in a 
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 The content of existing model identification instructions does not 
vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.181 Most courts follow 
some version of the model set forth by the D.C. Circuit in Telfaire, which 
instructs jurors to take into account: (1) the witness’s capacity and op-
portunity to view the offender; (2) the strength of the identification 
and the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the 
witness for identification; (3) any instances where the witness failed to 
make an identification; and (4) other aspects of credibility as would be 
considered relevant for any other witness.182 Other jurisdictions have 
developed more detailed instructions.183 For example, in California, 
the model instruction advises jurors to consider such additional factors 
as whether the witness was under stress at the time of the observation, 
whether the witness and the defendant are of different races, how 
closely the witness was paying attention, and the method of lineup used 
(photo array or physical lineup).184 The commentary, however, makes 
clear that the judge should not suggest that identifications are inher-
ently unreliable because that would improperly single out the testimony 
as suspect.185 A few courts have gone even further, actually telling jurors 
that scientific studies have demonstrated the dangers of mistake in hu-
man perception and identification.186 Such instructions are generally 
given as special instructions and are not derived from model instruc-
tions.187 
                                                                                                                      
truck for a five hour period on the day of the crime and the defendant did nothing to 
disguise his identity). 
181 See infra notes 182–187 and accompanying text. 
182 See 469 F.2d at 558–59. 
183 See, e.g., Advisory Comm. on Criminal Jury Instructions, Judicial Council of Cal., 
Criminal Jury Instructions no. 315 (2010) [hereinafter Cal. Criminal Jury Instruc-
tions], available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jury/criminaljuryinstructions/calcrim_juryins.pdf. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. (citing People v. Wright, 755 P.2d 1049, 1058 (Cal. 1988)). 
186 See United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The instruction 
given in Burrous is, in part, reproduced below: 
I want to caution you, first, that the kind of identification testimony you heard 
in this case must be scrutinized carefully. Scientific studies have amply demon-
strated the dangers of mistake in human perception and identification. Of 
course, this does not mean that the identification in this case is incorrect. I 
merely tell you this so that you understand the importance of carefully evaluat-
ing the evidence here. 
Id. 
187 See id. at 527, 530–31. 
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III. Jury Instructions: A Better Tool Than Expert Testimony 
 Although expert testimony is widely touted as the best device to 
combat the problem of mistaken identifications, it is not without signifi-
cant weaknesses and, in fact, can create new problems for the admini-
stration of justice.188 Jury instructions, on the other hand, although by 
no means perfect, avoid many of the same pitfalls.189 In fact, jury in-
structions carry several inherent advantages.190 This Part discusses those 
advantages.191 Section A considers the burden that regular use of eye-
witness expert testimony places on the courts by increasing the length 
and cost of criminal trials.192 Section B discusses the ways in which the 
availability of expert testimony disproportionately benefits affluent de-
fendants, while providing little aid to those who are indigent.193 Finally, 
Section C reviews the potential prejudicial effects of expert testimony 
and argues that jury instructions do not present such a risk.194 
A. Efficiency: Length and Cost of Trial 
 Expert testimony increases the length and cost of trials in a way 
that jury instructions do not.195 Expert testimony can cost thousands of 
dollars and, because of the complexity of the science, can take up sig-
nificant amounts of time.196 Thus, regular admission of eyewitness ex-
pert testimony significantly increases the length and cost of trials.197 
Jury instructions present no such problem.198 An instruction can be 
                                                                                                                      
188 See infra notes 195–228 and accompanying text. 
189 See infra notes 195–228 and accompanying text. 
190 See infra notes 195–228 and accompanying text. 
191 See infra notes 195–228 and accompanying text. 
192 See infra notes 195–205 and accompanying text. 
193 See infra notes 206–212 and accompanying text. 
194 See infra notes 213–228 and accompanying text. 
195 See Hampton v. State, 285 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Wis. 1979); Roger Park, Eyewitness Identifi-
cation: Expert Witnesses Are Not the Only Solution, 2 L., Probability & Risk 305, 307 (2003). 
196 See Park, supra note 195, at 307; Douglas Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent 
Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 329, 375 (1995) (stating that 
eyewitness identification specialists cost at least $500 per day for courtroom testimony and 
$100 per hour for consultation). See generally Alex Babitsky et al., SEAK, Inc., SEAK 
National Guide to Expert Witness Fees and Billing Procedures (2009) (finding that 
in-court testimony by non-medical experts can reach hourly rates in the thousands of dol-
lars). 
197 See Hampton, 285 N.W.2d at 873 (noting that the fact that expert testimony could 
increase the length and costs of trials is a legitimate factor for trial courts to take into con-
sideration when deciding whether to admit the testimony). 
198 See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (proposing an 
instruction that is several paragraphs long). 
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given in a matter of minutes and thus does not prolong the trial in any 
meaningful way.199 Furthermore, if a model instruction is adopted, 
judges will not be forced to wade through the scientific research of the 
proffered expert in the case to determine the validity of the expert’s 
methodology under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.200 Judge Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit echoed this sentiment in his 1999 con-
currence in United States v. Hall, acknowledging that jurors need to be 
made aware of the relevant social science research, but expressing a 
concern that every proffer of expert testimony would require a “trial 
about the process of trials,” which would divert attention from the real 
issues in the case.201 He asserted that properly devised jury instructions 
could improve the accuracy of trial verdicts without the delays caused 
by expert testimony.202 
 Courts have also expressed the legitimate concern that liberal ad-
mission of eyewitness experts could lead to a “battle of the experts,” in 
which jurors may be inclined to choose between experts based on the 
experts’ demeanors and respective credentials rather than relying on 
their own sensitivities to the factors affecting the reliability of identifica-
tions in the case.203 If a court relied on jury instructions instead, there 
would be no experts between which a “battle” could ensue.204 Jurors’ 
attention would thus be more squarely focused on the eyewitness evi-
                                                                                                                      
199 See id.; see also Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment 
with Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 Law & Hum. Behav. 409, 422–23 (1989) (re-
porting that a survey of judges revealed that judges did not believe even providing written 
jury instructions placed excessive demands on the judge or strains on the court). 
200 See 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993) (laying out the criteria under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence for determining the reliability of the expert’s methodology: (1) whether the 
theory can be tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) 
its known or potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards control-
ling its operation; and (4) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant 
scientific community). See generally David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying 
the Daubert Trilogy Need to Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—And Not Just the 
Methodological—Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2003) (explaining that when trial judges 
lack a sufficient understanding of underlying scientific principles, reliable scientific evi-
dence may be excluded under Daubert). 
201 165 F.3d 1095, 1118–19 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); accord United 
States v. Jones, No. 09-10048, 2010 WL 5475651, at *6 (D. Mass. Dec. 30, 2010). 
202 See Hall, 165 F.3d at 1120. 
203 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 934–35 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Park, 
supra note 195, at 306–07. 
204 See Hall, 165 F.3d at 1120 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
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dence, which—with a properly-formed jury instruction—they would be 
better able to evaluate.205 
B. Expert Eyewitness Testimony Disproportionately Benefits  
Affluent Defendants 
 The high cost of expert testimony places it beyond the reach of the 
overwhelming majority of the 77,000 suspects who are arrested each 
year based on an eyewitness identification.206 Nevertheless, courts have 
consistently held that there is no need to provide government funds for 
a defense expert, even in the case of an indigent defendant.207 Observ-
ers report that, as a result, no more than five-hundred cases per year 
include eyewitnesses experts.208 This illustrates that although eyewitness 
expert testimony might be impactful, it is rarely used.209 Unless courts 
are prepared to hold (and they seem unlikely to do so) that states are 
constitutionally required to provide funding for an eyewitness expert, 
some other mechanism must be employed.210 The legal system must 
find a way to ensure that jurors in all criminal trials—not just those in-
volving affluent defendants—are made aware of the factors that can 
affect the accuracy of identifications.211 Jury instructions provide such a 
mechanism.212 
                                                                                                                      
205 See id.; Jones, 2010 WL 5475651, at *6 (explaining that “lessons from social science” 
may be best incorporated into the trial process through jury instructions); Park, supra note 
195, at 306–07; see also infra notes 310–331 and accompanying text. 
206 See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorrobo-
rated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1487, 1515–16 (2008). 
207 See, e.g., Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the state was 
not required to appoint and pay for an expert to testify regarding the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony because cross-examination is sufficient to alert the jury to eyewitness reliability 
issues); State v. Broom, 533 N.E.2d 682, 691 (Ohio 1988) (ruling that the trial court’s refusal 
to appoint an eyewitness identification expert for an indigent defendant did not deny him 
due process where the defendant did not establish that denial of such expert assistance 
would result in an unfair trial). 
208 See Thompson, supra note 206, at 1516 (citing Wells et al., supra note 75, at 603, 
609). 
209 See id. 
210 See, e.g., Ylst, 921 F.2d at 886; Broom, 533 N.E.2d at 691. 
211 See Thompson, supra note 206, at 1515–16. 
212 See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558–59; Cal. Criminal Jury Instructions, supra note 183, 
no. 315. 
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C. Minimizing Prejudice 
 Jury instructions help to avoid any prejudice that may result from 
jurors giving inordinate weight to the testimony of an expert.213 Courts 
have long expressed the concern that experts will “dazzle the jurors 
with [their] aura of expertise,” thus making jurors skeptical of any eye-
witness.214 Because of an expert’s credentials and stature in the scien-
tific or psychological community, jurors may very well defer to the ex-
pert’s judgment, rather than independently evaluate the eyewitness 
evidence, using as a guide the information provided in the expert’s tes-
timony.215 Furthermore, courts have found that because of the nature 
of eyewitness identification research, experts are often unable to articu-
late the bases for their conclusions in a fashion understandable to lay 
jurors.216 As a result, jurors are often required to accept the expert’s 
assertions as to the accuracy of his or her conclusions without having 
the relied-upon data.217 In such a situation, where jurors can neither 
examine the data upon which the expert relied nor be given a satisfac-
torily clear explanation, they are likely to believe the expert and accord 
the testimony extra weight.218 Additionally, although advocates of ex-
pert testimony contend that they are merely providing “social frame-
work” testimony, jurors likely understand that the expert is being called 
by the defense and that the testimony is intended to push them toward 
doubting or disbelieving the witness.219 
                                                                                                                      
213 See infra notes 214–228 and accompanying text. 
214 See J.M. Doyle, Legal Issues in Eyewitness Evidence, in Psychological Methods in 
Criminal Investigation and Evidence 125, 139 (David C. Raskin ed., 1989). 
215 See United States v. Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d 55, 72 (1st Cir. 2009). The district 
court in Rodriguez-Berrios, in refusing to admit eyewitness expert testimony stated, “[w]hile 
often invaluable to the search for truth, [eyewitness] experts’ testimony carries a great deal 
of inherent reliability, which jurors can often confuse for infallibility” because of the cre-
dentials and stature of the source. Id. 
216 United States v. Nguyen, 793 F. Supp. 497, 512 (D.N.J. 1992). In a pretrial hearing 
to determine the admissibility of his testimony, the defense-proffered expert testified as to 
the low correlation between confidence and accuracy. Id. He stated that there was a “.27 
correlation” between confidence and accuracy in a study he conducted. Id. When asked to 
explain his findings, the expert drew a crude diagram, but could not clearly articulate how 
his conclusion was derived. Id. The court reasoned that if the proffered testimony was put 
to the jury, there was a strong likelihood that the jury would be misled or confused. Id. at 
513. 
217 See id. at 512. 
218 See Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d at 72; Nguyen, 793 F. Supp. at 512. 
219 See Leippe, supra note 74, at 910. 
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 Jury instructions, on the other hand, present far fewer dangers of 
prejudice.220 First, rather than being proffered by one party (the de-
fense), the information is coming from the judge, who brings an aura 
of impartiality.221 Thus, there is no need to evaluate the testimonial in-
firmities of the witness relaying the information.222 As such, jurors can 
concentrate on applying the information they receive from the judge to 
the evidence they have heard (or will hear), including the eyewitness 
testimony.223 Jurors are not being asked to evaluate additional evi-
dence.224 
 Additionally, jury instructions can be drafted so as to minimize 
confusion on the part of jurors by using precise and clear language.225 
The instruction can concisely lay out both the scientific findings re-
garding psychological processes and, if necessary, the bases for those 
findings.226 It is important that any instruction be a model instruction 
that can be applied, with slight modifications depending on the facts of 
the case, in all cases involving eyewitnesses.227 Judges are generally in-
sufficiently sophisticated in psychology to present cogent information 
about eyewitness perception and memory, and thus it should not be 
their responsibility to craft such an instruction.228 
                                                                                                                      
220 See infra notes 221–226 and accompanying text. It must be acknowledged that 
courts have expressed the concern that a judge may indeed be prejudicing the jury by 
singling out a piece of evidence and telling jurors to consider it with skepticism. See, e.g., 
Conley v. State, 607 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ark. 1980) (holding it improper for a trial judge to 
give an instruction listing factors to be considered by the jury in evaluating the eyewitness’s 
testimony because such instruction constituted an impermissible comment on the weight 
of the evidence). Similarly, commentators have warned that instructions to carefully scru-
tinize the eyewitness testimony might imply to some jurors that the judge wants them to 
discount the testimony. See Leippe, supra note 74, at 949. This danger can be minimized by 
using a carefully crafted jury instruction, designed to merely illuminate psychological pro-
cesses and phenomena—not tell jurors how to apply them to the case. See infra notes 310–
331 and accompanying text; infra app. 
221 See Hall, 469 F.3d at 1120 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
222 See Park, supra note 195, at 306–07; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 
87 Harv. L. Rev. 957, 958 (1974) (describing the four testimonial infirmities: perception, 
memory, ambiguity, and insincerity). 
223 See Estelle, 463 U.S. at 934–35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558–59. 
224 See Estelle, 463 U.S. at 934–35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558–59. 
225 See infra notes 310–331 and accompanying text. 
226 See infra notes 310–331 and accompanying text; infra app. 
227 See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 556; Cal. Criminal Jury Instructions, supra note 183, at 
xxiii. 
228 See Devenport et al., supra note 25, at 345; Leippe, supra note 74, at 949. 
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IV. Shortcomings of Common Eyewitness Jury Instructions 
 Many of the instructions now given by judges are ineffective at ap-
prising jurors of the factors that can negatively affect eyewitness accu-
racy.229 This Part discusses the various ways in which eyewitness identifi-
cation jury instructions fail to accomplish their purpose.230 Section A 
argues that general credibility instructions and some model instruc-
tions aggravate error by focusing jurors’ attention on factors that are 
poor indicia of reliability.231 Section B contends that the content of 
most existing instructions is at best inadequate and quite often confus-
ing.232 Finally, Section C explains that eyewitness jury instructions are 
unlikely to be effective when given at the end of trial as part of a 
lengthy, legalistic list of instructions.233 
A. Aggravation of Error: Reinforcing Erroneous Assumptions 
 Many general credibility instructions and even some model eye-
witness instructions focus jurors’ attentions on factors that are poor in-
dicia of reliability.234 As a result, the instructions can aggravate error by 
reinforcing erroneous assumptions about eyewitnesses.235 A common 
general credibility instruction tells jurors to use their own knowledge 
and life experiences to evaluate a witness’s testimony.236 In the context 
                                                                                                                      
 
229 See infra notes 234–262 and accompanying text. 
230 See infra notes 234–262 and accompanying text. 
231 See infra notes 234–238 and accompanying text. 
232 See infra notes 239–252 and accompanying text. 
233 See infra notes 253–262 and accompanying text. 
234 See Commonwealth v. Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Mass. 1997) (holding that 
language regarding witness confidence in a standard eyewitness instruction should be 
removed). 
235 See id; Wells et al., supra note 75, at 620 (stating that witness confidence is often the 
most important factor in a juror’s evaluation of an eyewitness). 
236 See, e.g., State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236, 1245 (Kan. 1981). The following is a typical 
credibility instruction, taken from Warren: 
It is for you to determine the weight and credit to be given to the testimony of 
each witness. You have a right to use that knowledge and experience which 
you possess in common with men in general in considering the testimony of 
each witness. You also may take the following factors into consideration when 
weighing a witness’s testimony: a) The witness’s ability and opportunity to ob-
serve and know the things about which he had testified; b) The clarity and 
accuracy of the witness’s memory; c) The witness’s manner and conduct while 
testifying; d) Any interest the witness may have in the result of the trial; and 
e) The reasonableness of the witness’s testimony when considered in light of 
all the evidence in the case; and f) Any bias, interest, prejudice, or motive the 
witness may have. 
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of an eyewitness, such an instruction does nothing to dispel the mis-
conception that confidence is a good predictor of accuracy.237 Worse 
still, some courts that give eyewitness instructions explicitly state that 
confidence is a legitimate factor for the jury to consider in its assess-
ment of the eyewitness.238 
B. The Content of Existing Instructions Is Inadequate and Confusing 
 The most widely used jury instruction concerning eyewitness tes-
timony is the United States v. Telfaire instruction, proposed by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1972.239 The instruc-
tion suffers from several flaws.240 Most model instructions that have 
been developed are insufficient because, although they list some factors 
that contribute to misidentifications, they do not explain the impact 
those factors can have on the accuracy of an eyewitness’s perception 
and memory.241 
 Studies involving the Telfaire instruction have shown that, as a re-
sult, the instruction does not increase jurors’ sensitivities to witnessing 
and identification conditions.242 Without any background in science or 
psychology, most jurors are unable to assess the impact of various psy-
                                                                                                                      
Id. 
237 See id. 
238 See People v. Sullivan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 876, 908–09 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Uhls, 
No. 102,771, 2011 WL 135021, at *8 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2011) (acknowledging the dan-
gers of instructing jurors to consider an eyewitness’s certainty but declining to rule that 
inclusion of a witness certainty instruction was reversible error). But see Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 
at 1121 (holding that the judge should not instruct the jury that they may take into ac-
count the certainty of an eyewitness because evidence suggests that there is no correlation 
between a witness’s confidence and the accuracy of the identification). Courts that model 
their eyewitness instructions after the factors set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court for de-
termining admissibility of identifications, one of which is witness certainty at the confron-
tation, make the same mistake, calling jurors’ attention to a factor that is a poor indicator 
of reliability. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972); cf. Warren, 635 P.2d at 1244 
(holding that if the five factors should be considered in determining the admissibility of 
the testimony, it would seem even more appropriate to require the jury to consider the 
same factors in weighing the credibility of the eyewitness identification testimony); supra 
note 114 (stating the five Biggers factors). 
239 See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Courts in many 
other jurisdictions have used the Telfaire instruction as a model, either adopting it exactly 
or modifying it slightly. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471, 476–77 (8th Cir. 
1979); State v. Burke, 448 A.2d 962, 966 (N.H. 1982) (suggesting that trial courts be guid-
ed by the Telfaire instruction). 
240 See infra notes 242–249 and accompanying text. 
241 See Telfaire, 409 F.2d at 558–59. 
242 See Gabriella Ramirez et al., Judges’ Cautionary Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony, 14 
Am. J. Forensic Psychol. 31, 45 (1996). 
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chological factors on the accuracy of the eyewitness.243 Chief Judge Da-
vid L. Bazelon expressed a similar concern in his concurrence in Tel-
faire, proposing an additional cross-racial identification instruction that 
would not only instruct jurors that the accuracy of an identification may 
be affected if the witness and suspect are of different races, but would 
give jurors sufficient information regarding the way in which the pres-
ence of that factor can affect reliability.244 Such guidance is essential if 
jury instructions are to be effective.245 
 Additionally, although the Telfaire instruction attempts to alert ju-
rors to some of the possible problems with perception, it does not pur-
port to instruct them about important aspects of the memory proc-
ess.246 The instruction tells jurors to consider the witness’s opportunity 
to view the offender, including the length of time available, distance 
between the witness and the offender, and lighting conditions.247 It 
makes no mention of the psychological processes, such as unconscious 
transference and substitution of false memories, which can have equally 
significant effects on eyewitness accuracy.248 Moreover, the Telfaire in-
struction fails to alert jurors to the lack of any positive relationship be-
tween witness confidence and identification accuracy.249 
 Furthermore, studies indicate that jurors often find the content of 
existing instructions confusing and thus rely on their prior knowledge 
and beliefs anyway.250 This is especially the case if the instructions con-
flict with those beliefs, which they often do.251 If jury instructions are 
ever to effectively educate jurors about the presence and impact of fac-
tors affecting eyewitness accuracy, they must be written in a far more 
clear and concise fashion.252 
C. Timing 
 One of the primary reasons jury instructions are ineffective is that 
they are generally given at the end of trial, as part of a long list of legal 
                                                                                                                      
243 See id. at 33. 
244 Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 560–61 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). 
245 See Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 45. 
246 See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558–59. 
247 Id. 
248 See id. 
249 See id. 
250 See Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 57. 
251 See id. 
252 See id; see also infra notes 310–331 and accompanying text; infra app. 
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instructions.253 Jurors currently receive little guidance as to how they 
should evaluate and interpret the evidence before that point.254 In-
structions given days or weeks after the eyewitness testifies do little to 
dispel erroneous assumptions that jurors bring with them.255 
 Studies have shown that jurors usually form firm opinions about 
evidence (and the defendant’s guilt) before the close of trial.256 This is 
especially the case where the trial involves an eyewitness.257 As evidence 
is presented, jurors begin to construct a story of what happened.258 Re-
search suggests that at the close of trial, jurors attempt to match the fea-
tures of their story to the verdict categories presented to them.259 Gen-
erally presented in narrative form itself, eyewitness testimony is often 
salient and dramatic.260 Not only is the testimony itself memorable, but 
it can work to color jurors’ perceptions of the rest of the evidence.261 
Thus, failure to alert jurors to the fallibility of the eyewitness’s testimony 
at the time of the testimony not only hampers jurors’ ability to accu-
rately evaluate the eyewitness testimony, but also potentially affects other 
evidence in the trial.262 
V. Jury Instructions Reconsidered: Proposals for Changes in 
Presentation and Content 
 Courts must change the content and mode of presentation of eye-
witness identification jury instructions.263 The current practice of pro-
viding confusing and often misleading instructions at the end of trial 
                                                                                                                      
253 See Leippe, supra note 74, at 949; see also E. Barrett Prettyman, Jury Instructions—First 
or Last?, 14 A.B.A. J. 1066, 1066 (1960) (“What manner of mind can go back over a stream 
of conflicting statements of alleged facts . . . and retrospectively fit all these recollections 
into a pattern of evaluation and judgment given him for the first time after the events? 
The human mind cannot do so.”). 
254 See, e.g., United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (declining 
to admit eyewitness expert testimony but providing an end-of-trial jury instruction). 
255 See supra notes 119–123 and accompanying text. But see Ramirez et al., supra note 
242, at 45, 46 (concluding that presenting instructions at the end of trial reduced the ju-
rors’ sensitivity to the eyewitness evidence and led them to vote not guilty regardless of the 
nature of the eyewitness, because jurors concluded that they must have missed something 
about the eyewitness and became skeptical). 
256 See Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 36 (citing Harry Kalven & Hans Zeisel, The 
American Jury (1987)). 
257 See Leippe, supra note 74, at 931; Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 36. 
258 See Leippe, supra note 74, at 931. 
259 See id. 
260 See id. at 930. 
261 See id. at 931. 
262 See id. 
263 See infra notes 267–331 and accompanying text. 
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has been ineffective.264 Section A of this Part argues that the instruc-
tions should be given before evidence is presented and Section B pro-
poses a new model instruction to be given at the outset of criminal tri-
als that involve eyewitness identifications.265 The Appendix to this Note 
includes the full text of the proposed instruction.266 
A. Timing: Eyewitness Instructions Before the Presentation of Evidence 
 Eyewitness instructions should be provided before the eyewitness 
ever takes the stand.267 Given at that point, the instructions would alert 
jurors to the factors they should consider in evaluating the eyewitness’s 
testimony.268 The instructions could further help to dispel jurors’ erro-
neous assumptions in advance.269 This Section discusses the benefits of 
such a charge and the legal basis for providing a preliminary or pre-
emptive eyewitness jury instruction.270 
1. Rationale and Empirical Basis 
 Unless jurors are told about the factors that can affect eyewitness 
accuracy before hearing the testimony, they will have little guidance as 
to how to evaluate the testimony.271 Thus, they are likely to rely on pre-
conceived notions and biases, which might interfere with an objective 
analysis of the evidence.272 Although there are mixed results on the ef-
fects of end-of-trial jury instructions on actual conviction rates, it is 
clear that such instructions do not increase juror sensitivity to eyewit-
ness evidence.273 
 In contrast, studies suggest that instructions given before the pres-
entation of evidence are more effective at alerting jurors to certain fac-
                                                                                                                      
264 See supra notes 229–262 and accompanying text. 
265 See infra notes 267–331 and accompanying text. 
266 See infra app. 
267 See United States v. Ruppell, 666 F.2d 261, 274 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Prettyman, 
supra note 253, at 1066 (noting the flaws in a system where instructions are given only at 
the end of trial). 
268 See Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 
Law & Hum. Behav. 163, 177 (1977); Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 45. 
269 See Leippe, supra note 74, at 925. 
270 See infra notes 271–309 and accompanying text. 
271 See B. Michael Dann & George Logan, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79 Judi-
cature 280, 281 (1996) (describing the recommendation of a jury reform committee that 
courts provide preliminary instructions); Nancy Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the 
Twenty-First Century, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 449, 498 (2006). 
272 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 199, at 413–14. 
273 See Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 45. 
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tors that can affect eyewitness perception and memory.274 There ap-
pear to be four advantages of pretrial instructions.275 First, jurors given 
preliminary instructions are more likely than jurors instructed at the 
end of trial to focus on relevant evidence and remember it in their de-
liberations.276 The former group are more likely to rely on their recol-
lection of the quality of the eyewitness evidence and to discriminate 
between good and poor witnessing conditions.277 Second, preliminary 
instructions provide jurors with a framework within which they can or-
ganize the evidence.278 Research has demonstrated that recall for in-
formation is improved when it is part of some overall organization or 
scheme.279 Third, preliminary instructions can help jurors address 
questions of credibility and inference as they arise, rather than retro-
spectively.280 Finally, when revised eyewitness instructions are provided 
only before the evidence, jurors’ sensitivity to four crucial witnessing 
factors— lineup fairness, cross-racial identification, stress, and eyewit-
ness confidence—is significantly improved.281 
                                                                                                                     
2. Legal Basis 
 Although it has long been the practice for the judge to instruct 
jurors on procedural issues, requirements of proof, and relevant sub-
stantive law at the end of trial,282 the wisdom of this practice has been 
repeatedly questioned.283 The rules of evidence and of criminal proce-
 
274 See Elwork et al., supra note 268, at 177; Saul Kassin & Lawrence Wrightsman, On the 
Requirements of Proof: The Timing of Judicial Instructions and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. Person-
ality & Soc. Psychol. 1877, 1884 (1979); Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 45. 
275 See infra notes 276–281 and accompanying text. 
276 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 199, at 413. 
277 See Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 46. Gabriella Ramirez and her colleagues also 
found, however, that the discrimination, at least with the Telfaire instructions, was not bet-
ter than that observed without any cautionary instructions. See id. 
278 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 199, at 413. 
279 See id. 
280 See William Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. Chi. Legal F. 119, 130. 
281 See Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 58. If instructions are presented before the evi-
dence, they should not then be repeated fully after the evidence. See id. at 45. Research sug-
gests that such an approach leads jurors to vote guilty regardless of the nature of the eyewit-
ness evidence because it overemphasizes the role of the eyewitness, who jurors tend to believe 
even under poor witnessing conditions. See id. at 45, 46. But cf. Margery Malkin Koosed, Re-
forming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Protect the Innocent, 42 Creighton L. Rev. 
595, 621 (2009) (proposing eyewitness jury instructions at the opening of trial, before and 
after an eyewitness testifies, and at the close of trial). 
282 See, e.g., Dodson v. United States, 23 F.2d 401, 403 (4th Cir. 1928). 
283 See Prettyman, supra note 253, at 1066; Ramirez et al, supra note 242, at 36–37. 
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dure do not prohibit substantive preliminary instructions.284 Some 
courts have recognized the benefits of pretrial instructions and several 
states have revised their rules of civil and criminal procedure to make 
explicit provisions for preliminary instructions.285 Furthermore, re-
search and practice do not support the contention that pretrial instruc-
tions would be impractical or otherwise place excessive demands on 
the court.286 
 Pretrial instruction is permitted by the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.287 Under Rule 30(c), a judge may instruct the jury before 
or after the arguments are completed or both.288 Many states have simi-
lar provisions, as many states’ rules of procedure are modeled after the 
federal rules.289 Additionally, the American Bar Association guidelines 
suggest that judges give preliminary instructions explaining the jury’s 
role, trial procedures, the nature of evidence and its evaluation, the 
issues to be addressed, and basic relevant legal principles.290 The guide-
lines also call for judges to instruct jurors when it is “necessary to the 
jurors’ proper understanding of the proceedings.”291 
 Courts have recognized the benefits of pretrial instructions, noting 
that it is the better practice to instruct the jury on the fundamentals of 
a criminal trial before taking any evidence.292 Those courts explain that 
once the jury is sworn and the trial has begun, ideally, the judge should 
explain to the jurors their function as arbiters of the facts, the pre-
sumption of innocence, the burden of reasonable doubt, and other 
matters that are necessary to guide them through the trial.293 Courts 
have further noted that pretrial instruction gives jurors “some advance 
understanding of the applicable principles of law so that they will not 
receive the evidence and arguments in a vacuum.”294 A preliminary in-
                                                                                                                      
284 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(a)–(c); see, e.g., Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.6(c) (providing an ex-
ample of a state approach that provides for preliminary instructions to prepare the jury for 
trial and instruct them on basic legal principles). 
285 See infra notes 300–303 and accompanying text. 
286 See infra notes 305–307 and accompanying text. 
287 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(a)–(c). 
288 See id. 30(c). 
289 See Wayne R. LaFave et al., State Reliance on the Federal Model, 1 Crim. Proc. § 1.3(e) 
(3d ed. Nov. 2009), available at Westlaw CRIMPROC (stating that roughly half of the states 
have court rules of criminal procedure that borrow heavily from the Federal Rules). 
290 See Am. Jury Project, Am. Bar Ass’n, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials princ. 
6.C.1 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf. 
291 See id. princ. 13.D.2. 
292 See Ruppell, 666 F.2d at 274. 
293 See id. 
294 People v. Valenzuela, 142 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Ct. App. 1977). 
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struction on the factors that affect eyewitness accuracy would provide 
similar guidance to jurors.295 
 Furthermore, courts frequently instruct jurors on special precau-
tions they should take in evaluating the credibility of accomplices, in-
formants, alibi witnesses, and immunized witnesses, in anticipation of 
those witnesses’ testimony.296 Cautionary instructions are permitted on 
certain types of testimony due to the specific dangers they present to 
the truth-seeking process.297 Eyewitness testimony—because of the per-
vasive misconceptions of jurors—presents similar risks.298 Thus, eyewit-
ness instructions should be given in advance of the testimony to pro-
vide jurors with the necessary background information to effectively 
evaluate the testimony of the eyewitness.299 
 Recognizing the wisdom of including some instructions at the be-
ginning of trial, several states have made explicit provisions in their 
rules of civil and criminal procedure for preliminary instructions.300 In 
the 1990s, Arizona reformed its rules of procedure, urging judges to 
provide preliminary instructions about the relevant substantive law or 
standards of proof, as well as other matters that might be relevant in 
the case.301 Arizona implemented the new rule with the goal of assisting 
jurors “in organizing and understanding the evidence as they hear it” 
and improving their recall.302 Similarly, under Kansas law, a judge may, 
after opening statements, instruct the jury “on such matters as in the 
judge’s opinion will assist the jury in considering the evidence as it is 
presented.”303 Eyewitness instructions given at the outset of trial would 
help jurors to better organize and understand the eyewitness’ testimony 
and the witnessing conditions and psychological factors that could im-
pact the witness’s testimony and identification of the defendant.304 
 A frequent criticism of pretrial instructions is that they would be 
impractical because the judge does not know what evidence will be pre-
                                                                                                                      
295 See id. 
296 See, e.g., United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 733 (7th Cir. 1993) (describing trial 
court’s preliminary instruction, in which it told jurors to consider the testimony of infor-
mants with “great care”); State v. Piaskowski, 587 N.W.2d 213 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (includ-
ing an accomplice credibility instruction in preliminary instructions to jury). 
297 See People v. Whalen, 451 N.E.2d 212, 214–15 (N.Y. 1983). 
298 See supra notes 119–123 and accompanying text. 
299 See Whalen, 451 N.E.2d at 215. 
300 See, e.g., Ariz. R. Civ. P. 51(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.6(c). 
301 See Dann & Logan, supra note 271, at 281. 
302 See id. 
303 See Kan. R. Civ. P. 60-251(a). 
304 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 199, at 413. 
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sented at trial.305 Research, however, does not support that conten-
tion.306 In fact, a survey of judges who provided jury instructions before 
actual trials found that those judges disagreed with the proposition, 
finding the practice neither impractical nor overly cumbersome.307 Fur-
thermore, jurisdictions that encourage preliminary instructions recog-
nize the need for flexibility.308 Many commentators echo that sentiment 
and suggest that jurors be told that any instructions given prior to the 
presentation of evidence are subject to change depending on the de-
velopments at trial.309 
B. A “Plain Language” Eyewitness Identification Instruction 
 Merely changing the point during trial at which eyewitness identi-
fication jury instructions are given is insufficient.310 A new model in-
struction should be developed that would make the scientific principles 
meaningful and understandable to lay people, but still accurately con-
vey the information.311 This Section proposes a new model eyewitness 
identification jury instruction.312 
 The proposed eyewitness identification instruction was crafted with 
four basic goals in mind.313 First, eyewitness instructions need to be sim-
plified.314 By using plain language, the proposed instruction attempts to 
convey complex scientific principles using relatively common terms.315 
                                                                                                                      
305 See Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 37. 
306 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 199, at 426. 
307 See id. 
308 See, e.g., Pa. R. Crim. P. 647(D). The Pennsylvania rule states that a 
judge may give instructions at any time during the trial as the judge deems 
necessary and appropriate . . . for instance, if a specific defense is raised by ev-
idence presented during trial, judge may want to instruct on elements of de-
fense immediately after it is presented to enable jury to properly evaluate the 
evidence. 
Id.; see also Valenzuela, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 655 (noting that judges must be aware of the fact 
that they may have to rearticulate correct rules of law at the end of trial if it appears that 
attorneys have “befuddled” the jury). 
309 See Marder, supra note 271, at 498. 
310 See supra notes 267–309 and accompanying text; infra notes 311–331 and accompa-
nying text. 
311 See infra notes 313–331 and accompanying text; infra app. 
312 See infra notes 313–331 and accompanying text; infra app. 
313 See infra notes 314–331 and accompanying text. 
314 See Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 44 (finding that subject-jurors generally found 
the Telfaire instructions (when given with other jury instructions) to be “too long, boring, 
repetitious, confusing, and hard to remember”). 
315 See infra app. 
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It dispenses with psychological and legal jargon, wherever possible, and 
uses words understandable to lay jurors.316 It also inserts concrete ex-
amples where helpful to explain certain psychological phenomena.317 
 Second, it is important to alert jurors to the factors that affect eye-
witness accuracy, but to do so in a balanced way.318 Failing to present 
the information in a neutral way would be highly prejudicial, likely 
causing jurors to view the eyewitness with extreme skepticism.319 The 
proposed instruction attempts to strike a balance, generally stating that 
the factors described “can” or “may” have a certain effect, not that they 
“do” or “did.”320 Additionally, the instruction discusses factors that can 
increase accuracy as well as those that can decrease accuracy.321 
 The proposed instruction would likely be criticized by some as de-
fense-biased and rejected for requiring a judge to provide information 
likely to help one side.322 Admittedly, the instruction lists numerous 
factors that can contribute to eyewitness inaccuracy, and if one of those 
is present in the case, the jury may be more likely to acquit.323 The 
point of providing the instruction, however, is not to increase the num-
ber of “not guilty” verdicts; it is to increase the number of correct ver-
dicts.324 Thus, the proposed instruction also lays out factors that can 
increase reliability and emphasizes that eyewitness evidence can be ex-
traordinarily valuable.325 It calls attention to circumstances that can in-
crease a witness’s ability to perceive, including distance and lighting, 
and states that, although many people have decreased capacities to ob-
serve while under stress, others are made more alert.326 Additionally, 
although the instruction explicitly mentions that eyewitness confidence 
is not necessarily indicative of accuracy, it also reminds jurors that they 
                                                                                                                      
316 See infra app.; see also Amiram Elwork et al., Making Jury Instructions Under-
standable 176–77 (1982) (suggesting that drafters of jury instructions should try to use 
common words instead of legal jargon); Laurence Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury 
Instructions That Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 198, 233 (1984) 
(stating that simplified language and organized presentation of concepts can help jurors). 
317 See infra app.; see also Elwork et al., supra note 316, at 177–78 (proposing that jury 
instructions should use concrete words that are easily visualized and, if abstract words must 
be used, they should be followed with concrete illustrations). 
318 See Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 56. 
319 See id. at 56, 60–62. 
320 See infra app. 
321 See infra app. 
322 See infra app. 
323 See infra app. 
324 See infra app. 
325 See infra app. 
326 See infra app. 
2011] Eyewitness Identification Jury Instructions 689 
can accept an identification even if the witness is not entirely confi-
dent.327 
 Third, the instruction attempts to refute common erroneous as-
sumptions.328 It directly addresses some of the most misunderstood 
concepts concerning eyewitness identifications, including eyewitness 
confidence, the effect of stress and a weapon, and cross-racial identifi-
cation.329 
 Finally, the instruction has been written in such a way as to allow a 
judge to delete and add supplemental instructions without affecting 
the rest of the instructions.330 Several sections of the instruction will 
only be relevant in cases presenting certain circumstances.331 
Conclusion 
 The frequent inaccuracy of eyewitnesses presents a significant 
problem for the administration of justice. Courts must employ some 
mechanism to educate jurors about the psychological and systematic 
factors that impact eyewitness accuracy. Although admitting expert psy-
chological testimony is certainly better than providing no guidance at 
all, it is not without significant weaknesses and can in fact present new 
problems. Jury instructions, on the other hand, are without many of 
these pitfalls and thus provide a better alternative. Problematically, 
however, many of the instructions now given by courts are ineffective at 
apprising jurors of the factors that can affect eyewitness accuracy. Thus, 
the content and presentation of eyewitness instructions must be 
changed in such a way as to increase their effectiveness. The judge 
should instruct jurors on the factors that affect an eyewitness’s ability to 
perceive and remember at the beginning of trial, before evidence is 
presented. But merely moving the current instructions to the begin-
ning of trial is insufficient—psychological research should also be in-
cluded in language understandable to lay jurors. If courts give the pro-
                                                                                                                      
327 See infra app. 
328 See infra app.; see also Ramirez et al., supra note 242, at 57–58 (discussing a study that 
showed instruction on the legal definition of a crime was most effective when a supplemen-
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329 See infra app. 
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posed model instruction before eyewitness evidence is presented, jurors 
will be better able to evaluate the testimony they will hear. 
Christian Sheehan 
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Appendix332 
 One of the issues in this case is the identification of [defendant’s 
name] as the person who committed the crime. It is the Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney’s [or Assistant U.S. Attorney’s] job to prove to you that 
[defendant’s name] is the one who committed the crime. If you are not 
convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant’s name] com-
mitted the crime, you must find [him or her] not guilty. 
 You will hear testimony from someone who says [he or she] wit-
nessed the event. A witness’s testimony is a reflection of [his or her] 
perception and memory. It is not necessarily an expression of fact. As a 
result, the witness’s perception may or may not be accurate. 
 I am going to ask you to pay close attention to the eyewitness’s tes-
timony. Shortly, I will tell you about a number of factors you should 
think about when considering the testimony. This is very important be-
cause some of this information may contradict your current beliefs. 
Keep in mind that eyewitness testimony can be extraordinarily valuable 
evidence and I am in no way telling you whether to believe or disbelieve 
the witness’s testimony. I am just giving you some background informa-
tion to help you in your assessment. Ultimately, you, and you alone, 
must decide whether the witness has convinced you that the person [he 
or she] saw was [defendant’s name]. It is not essential that the witness 
[himself or herself] be one-hundred percent convinced about the ac-
curacy of [his or her] identification, as long as you are satisfied that the 
Assistant District Attorney [or Assistant U.S. Attorney] has met [his or 
her] burden of proof. On the other hand, even if the witness seems 
positive of [his or her] identification, this does not relieve you of your 
duty to carefully consider [his or her] testimony. This is especially true 
if you find that it is the only evidence that directly supports the claim 
that [defendant’s name] committed the crime. 
 There are two types of factors you should consider: factors at the 
time of the crime and factors that come into play after the crime. 
 I will first talk to you about factors that may have an impact on the 
witness’s perception at the time of the crime. You should ask yourself: 
Did the witness have an opportunity to observe the person who com-
mitted the crime? Think about the length of time the witness had for 
observation and how close the witness was to the person [he or she] 
claims was [defendant’s name]. You may also consider the quality of 
                                                                                                                      
332 This Appendix sets forth the full text of the instruction proposed in Part V.B of this 
Note. The bracketed text represents case-specific instructions. 
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lighting in the area. A witness is more likely to make an accurate identi-
fication if [he or she] has a good opportunity to view the events. 
 You may also consider whether the witness was under stress. High 
levels of stress sometimes make identifying a person more difficult. If a 
witness is afraid or distracted, [his or her] capacity to observe and re-
member may be reduced, although this is not always the case; some-
times, a person becomes more alert and perceptive under stress. On 
the other hand, if the witness did not think the event was important at 
the time, [he or she] might not have been paying close attention. 
 [The Assistant District Attorney [or Assistant U.S. Attorney] alleges 
that a weapon was used by [defendant’s name]. When a weapon is pre-
sent, witnesses sometimes concentrate on the weapon instead of the 
person holding the weapon. This might make them less likely to re-
member the person’s face]. 
 You may also consider whether the witness knows [defendant’s 
name] or whether [he or she] saw [defendant’s name] before. Some-
times, prior exposure helps an eyewitness to recognize a person. But 
sometimes, it leads to a mistaken identification when a witness confuses 
people seen at different times. For example, if a witness got off of a bus 
before witnessing the crime, [he or she] might mistakenly remember 
another passenger on the bus when asked to identify the perpetrator of 
the crime. It is for you to decide whether prior contact between the 
witness and [defendant’s name], if there was any, makes the identifica-
tion in this case more credible, less credible, or had no effect. 
 I am now going to talk to you about factors that can affect an eye-
witness’s memory after the crime. You should consider: How much 
time passed between the crime and the witness’s identification? Mem-
ory loss increases over time. Therefore, the sooner the identification is 
made, the more likely it is that the witness will remember the person 
accurately. 
 [You will hear that the witness in this case identified [defendant’s 
name] at a police lineup. Pay close attention to testimony about the 
circumstances of the lineup. You must make sure that the witness made 
the identification on [his or her] own and was not influenced by out-
side factors, such as hints by the police. You may consider whether [de-
fendant’s name] was picked out of a lineup made up of similar-looking 
individuals. If [he or she] was, the identification may be more reliable 
than if [he or she] had stood out from others in the lineup]. 
 You may also consider whether the initial identification was con-
ducted fairly. If the witness felt that [he or she] was forced to choose 
someone, the identification might be less reliable. Also think about 
whether the witness might have been influenced by what others told 
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[him or her] or other information—such as reading about the crime in 
a newspaper—after the crime. 
 You should also consider whether the witness was unable to make 
an identification on a prior occasion or if [he or she] identified an-
other person before [defendant’s name]. 
 People sometimes have trouble identifying members of another 
race. This is something you may want to think about when listening to 
the witness’s testimony. 
 Finally, although you may always consider a witness’s demeanor, 
keep in mind that the confidence displayed by a witness does not nec-
essarily mean that [he or she] is accurate. A witness tends to become 
more confident in [his or her] identification over time, regardless of its 
initial accuracy. It is possible for a witness to be confident and still be 
wrong. On the other hand, a witness may be unsure and still be correct 
in [his or her] identification. 
 Keep in mind that the factors I have just outlined for you are 
merely guidelines for you to use in evaluating the eyewitness. You are 
the sole judges of the evidence you will hear. 
